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University College London, London, UKPerformance measurement provides critical information for strategic decision-making about the future of national
infrastructure provision. The process of developing appropriate performance indicators must be based on an
understanding of the high-level desired outcomes that infrastructure systems are intended to facilitate. These outcomes
may be complex and dynamic and vary across the spectrum of infrastructure stakeholders. This paper demonstrates a
conceptual process for developing outcome-related performance indicators by using case studies from the UK rail and
water sectors. The case studies show that the process can provide an industry-specific picture of desired outcomes across
the main stakeholders, together with their dimensions and associated performance indicators (so-called partial indicators).
The work highlights potential shortfalls of a sector-by-sector approach to outcome-oriented strategic performance
indicators and suggests that further work is required to integrate partial indicators to provide a holistic picture that
recognises the contributions often made by a variety of infrastructures to a given high-level desired outcome.Introduction
A suite of infrastructure performance indicators is required to help
steer UK infrastructure projects towards meeting society’s desired
high-level outcomes – for example, a strong economy, wider home
ownership and better communications. Over the past few decades,
UK infrastructure investment has been less effective than it should
have been in contributing to those outcomes (HM Treasury and
Infrastructure UK, 2011). The government is now seeking to
address the problem with a pipeline of infrastructure projects out
to 2021, valued at £483 billion (IPA, 2016); therefore, it is vital to
establish clearly the links between infrastructure projects and the
contribution that they make to society as a whole.
Two research projects, iBUILD (Infrastructure Business Models,
Valuation and Innovation for Local delivery) and ICIF (International
Centre for Infrastructure Futures), jointly funded by the Engineering
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC, 2016) and the
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, 2016), have
investigated the approach that was used by Infrastructure UK (IUK;
subsequently merged with the Infrastructure and Projects Authority),
resulting in the creation of a five-step conceptual process for the
development of new, outcome-oriented performance indicators.
An earlier paper (Dolan et al., 2016) argues the need within the UK
for infrastructure performance indicators that can help to measure
infrastructure’s contribution to high-level desired societal outcomes
and to decide whether strategic changes are necessary to ensure that
infrastructure performance remains ‘fit for purpose’. Current
indicators used for managing national infrastructure in the UK, and
indeed elsewhere, do not meet this need. Through a consultation
exercise, Dolan et al. (2016) identified five general characteristicsof importance in future-facing strategic performance indicators:
joined-up, transparent, flexible, forward-looking and outcome-
focused. This process also highlighted the appetite of government
and infrastructure practitioners for indicators that relate directly to
public expectations and need, allow for intelligent design and
account for different audiences.
Dolan et al.’s (2016) five-step process is summarised in Figure 1.
It is based on international best practice, emerging theory and the
aforementioned consultation. It is essentially forward-looking, in
contrast to the UK’s current backward-looking method, which
covers the nation’s key infrastructures (major roads, rail network,
airports, container ports, electricity network, gas network, flood
risk prevention and waste disposal), and uses data to establish
historic performance trends (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).
This paper describes two case study applications of the process
within the water and rail sectors. These provide proof of concept
for the first three steps of the process. Research on steps 4 and 5 is
still ongoing and therefore is outside the scope of this paper. To
this end, both applications set out to illustrate the proposed process
and, in doing so, to demonstrate that it is possible to construct
indicators from existing data that show explicitly an infrastructure’s
performance in facilitating a societally desired outcome.
The paper begins with some background: recapping the need for
the process, briefly describing the five steps, and exploring the
interfaces between government, infrastructure operators and users
and the differing points of view that they have regarding
infrastructure outcomes. The paper then presents and discusses the143
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recommendations.
Background
A nation’s infrastructure exists to facilitate and enable society’s
high-level desired outcomes: from health and well-being to
prosperity and growth. Long-term decisions about the provision
of strategic infrastructure require knowledge of these desired
outcomes and the role that infrastructure plays in delivering them.
An infrastructure system is performing well if it is effectively and
satisfactorily enabling society to achieve its desired outcomes;
conversely, it is performing poorly if it does not.
Strategic performance indicators for infrastructure are required
that can show the extent to which infrastructure is enabling
society to achieve its desired outcomes (Mihyeon Jeon and
Amekudzi, 2005). The indicators must be based on a good
understanding of those outcomes and the ways in which
infrastructure facilitates them. This is largely not the case with the
indicators currently used; in many cases, they track infrastructure
outputs only (Network Rail, 2015a). For example, in the case of
rail, infrastructure failures relative to train-kilometres, while
useful for managing day-to-day operations, is of limited use in
isolation to national strategy.
The generic, high-level, five-step process for the development of
outcome-oriented, strategic performance indicators for infrastructure
(Dolan et al., 2016) is outlined in Figure 1. Step 1 involves144
ed by [ Newcastle University] on [21/12/16]. Published with permission by the Iidentifying and drawing together in a coherent way the desired
outcomes. Step 2 is an exploration of the dimensions relating to
each outcome – for example, if the desired outcome is a secure
water supply, what are the factors (outcome dimensions)
characterising that? (Note: the dimensions do not necessarily have
any direct causal effect on the outcome.) Step 3 involves the
selection of partial indicators for each dimension; these are the
things that will be measured to assess dimension performance and
ultimately synthesised along with other partial indicators to provide
a desired outcome performance indicator. Synthesis takes place in
step 4; step 5 is about the availability of data required to support
the five-step process.
Successful completion of the first three steps provides the basis
for assessing the feasibility of the conceptual process. Step 4
concerns a non-trivial decision for those using the indicators to
decide the relative importance of each partial indicator to form a
single outcome-oriented headline indicator and even whether they
wish to aggregate the data in this way at all. Such aggregation can
be achieved through many widespread approaches that are not the
focus of this study. Step 5 is included as the process recommends
the identification of further indicators where necessary. As this
study, with its aim of demonstrating the feasibility of the process,
draws only from existing indicators, it is somewhat moot here.
The infrastructure performance indicator development process
operates in the context of the relationships between the principal
stakeholders and the differing points-of-view that eachIdentify, understand and structure desired outcomes
Purpose: identify and articulate the desired outcomes relevant to the
infrastructure system whose performance is to be measured.
Outputs: (a) in-depth multiperspective discussion and analysis of the desired
outcomes infrastructure is expected to enable; (b) a structured list of desired
outcomes (based on synthesis to integrate multiple perspectives)
Purpose: decompose each desired outcome into a structured set of the 
outcome dimensions (and subdimensions) of which it is comprised.
Outputs: (a) in-depth discussion and analysis of outcome dimension; (b) a
conceptual map (with supporting justification) of the interconnected set of
outcome dimensions that comprise each desired outcome
Explore multiple outcome dimensions
Select partial indicators
Aggregate indicators
Evaluate and fulfil data requirements
Purpose: identify partial indicators for each outcome dimension and 
subdimension mapped in step 2.
Outputs: (a) in-depth discussion and analysis of how outcome dimensions
can best be measured; (b) a complete set of partial indicators for each
desired outcome
Purpose: create one headline outcome-oriented PI for each 
desired outcome.
Output: a fully justified method and formula to calculate a headline
indicator for each desired outcome based on the partial indicators relating
to the dimensions from which the outcome is comprised
Purpose: identify data availability gaps, and where needed, develop
the strategic case for additional data collection.
Outputs: (a) ensured data availability for all partial indicators; (b) where
data collection is not possible, proposed and justified alternative partial
indicators
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Figure 1. Outcome-oriented performance indicator development process (Dolan et al., 2016)CE under the CC-BY license 
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Downloaded bystakeholder has with regard to infrastructure and the desired
outcomes. For the purposes of the case studies, the principal
stakeholders have been assumed to be the national government,
infrastructure regulators, infrastructure managers (otherwise
referred to as the industry) and infrastructure users.
Both of the case studies described here are set within the context of
the UK’s operational, regulatory and governance systems. A model
of this operational context is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows
for each of the principal stakeholders the following: components of
the existing infrastructure development and supply process (circles
shaded grey); the proposed new components (circles shaded white)
supporting the development of the new performance indicators;
and the relationships linking them together. The stakeholders are
each operating under a wide range of different incentives and
constraints, with the result that they bring to the issue of high-level
desired outcomes a variety of points of view. These different points
of view and their associated indicators must be synthesised, as
shown in Figure 2. Care needs to be taken with these to ensure that
there is no confusion over the terminology employed that could
hinder identification of outcomes, dimensions and partial indicators
(i.e. steps 1–3 of the process).
National government takes the lead in setting the high-level
desired outcomes, driven principally by the aims of the ruling [ Newcastle University] on [21/12/16]. Published with permission by the ICE unpolitical party, but shaped by appropriate factual evidence,
tempered by considerations of implementation feasibility and
subject to a process of consultation facilitated by green papers
(Civil Service, 2013; Hallsworth and Rutter, 2011; IFG, 2011;
PASC, 2007, 2014; Parliament, 2016a; STC, 2006). Desired
outcomes are used to inform development of policy, which is
reified through the publication of white papers and the making of
legislation/regulatory guidance in Parliament (2016b). Policy is
implemented through strategy (PASC, 2010); however, there is an
increasing tendency for the government not to specify strategy
and leave the supply chain to decide how best to deliver.
At the industry level, companies are required to operate according to
their licences while at the same time fulfilling their duties to their
shareholders. In the case of rail, Network Rail is, broadly speaking,
the owner and operator of the national UK rail network. It is a ‘not-
for-dividend’ company, so it does not have shareholders in the
normal meaning of the word; however, it is accountable to the Office
of Rail and Road (ORR), which determines the income received
from the government and the outputs that must be achieved during
each 5-year control period (Network Rail, 2016a). ORR monitors the
performance of Network Rail against these and a wide range of other
operational outputs (ORR, 2016a); collectively, they are referred to as
industry outcomes in Figure 2. Passenger services are operated on
this network by train operating companies granted franchises toParticipates
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Figure 2. Three-viewpoint context depicting the existing infrastructure development process (grey circles), the proposed additional
components (white circles) and the relationships linking them together145
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These are further complemented by commercial freight operators.
The situation, with regard to conflation of outputs and outcomes,
is broadly similar in the water industry; however, the physical and
organisational arrangements are somewhat different. Regional
companies providing water and sewerage services to domestic and
industrial users own and operate the physical infrastructure, with
most having shareholders who expect a commercial rate of return
on their investment. The economic regulator, the Water Services
Regulation Authority (Ofwat) sets prices in consultation with the
operating companies and fulfils a similar role to ORR and steers
the industry through a series of 5-year control periods. The
Drinking Water Inspectorate regulates the quality of public
supplies, while the Environment Agency also regulate in relation
to abstraction, reservoirs and other environmental matters.
The end-user viewpoint is challenging to distil given that there are
many individuals acting independently. However, groups like
Passenger Focus and the Rail Freight Group for the rail industry
do collect information on customer perception of service, which is
fed back to the industry; as will be seen later in the water case
study, the water industry is working with its users under auspices
of Ofwat. Otherwise, users are left with their own ideas of what
sort of service infrastructure should provide and their perceptions
of how well infrastructure companies, and by implication
government, are delivering.
Case study applications of the proposed
outcome-oriented performance indicator
development process
The first three steps of the process are described in the next
sections for the water and rail sectors. Identifying the intended146
ed by [ Newcastle University] on [21/12/16]. Published with permission by the Ioutcomes of national government policy presents general and
specific challenges. Firstly, the intended outcomes of national
policy are not always explicitly stated and may be open to
interpretation. Secondly, the timing within a parliamentary
cycle can impact on the clarity and availability of national
government policy. Finally, as the outcomes enabled by
infrastructure can be far reaching, there is no simple way to
identify which policies rely on which infrastructure systems.
Indeed, when adopting a system-of-system view of infrastructure,
it is conceivable that specific systems contribute to outcomes far
removed in time and space from the assets and processes of that
system – for example, the outcomes enabled by the rail system
are not limited to the policies of the Department for Transport. To
address these issues, different approaches were implemented for
each of the case studies.
UK water sector
Step 1 of the five-step process requires the identification of the
outcomes desired from each of the four stakeholder-viewpoints.
At the time this exercise was undertaken in mid-2015, the UK
government was in a period of post-election transition; therefore,
for the purposes of this exercise, policies from the end of the
2010–2015 government were used to identify desired water-
related outcomes, in particular, policies owned by the Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department for
Environment Food and Rural Affairs (see Table 1).
Ofwat and the water companies have implemented a framework
for identifying the desired outcomes of the sector’s end users. For
the 5-year control period from 2015 to 2020, the UK’s water
companies identified 171 outcomes valued by their customers
(Ofwat, 2014). The outcomes covered ‘essential elements’ such as
excellent water quality, protection of the natural environment andTable 1. Outcome from the water sector viewpointsNational government End users (domestic and industry)CE under the CC-BY license Governance (internal and external)1 Increased competition in the UK water industry
2 Internationally competitive
3 Protected environment Protecting and improving the environment Limited impact on the environment
4 Secure water supply Dependable water supply Reliable supply
Resilient supply
5 Available supply (i.e. in the right location)
6 Regional homogeneity
7 High standard of drinking water Safe, clean drinking waterImproved water quality
8 Effective sewerage service Safe and dependable sewage treatment
9 Sustainable freshwater fisheries
10 Efficient customers
11 Improved communities
12 Affordable, accurate, informative and clear bills
13 Satisfied customers Satisfied customers
14 Safe workplaces Safe operations
15 Skilled and motivated workforce
16 Reputable and trustworthy suppliers
17 A fair and efficient business Resource-efficient operationCost-efficient operation
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Downloaded byreliable waste water services. Extensively comparing the 171
outcomes of the different water companies shows a significant
overlap, making it possible to condense the list into the 12 generic
‘End user’-desired outcomes shown in Table 1. For example,
Northumbrian Water (2014) stated, ‘We protect and enhance the
environment in delivering our services’, while United Utilities
(2013) said, ‘The natural environment is protected and improved
in the way we deliver our services’.
Discussions with those involved in UK infrastructure governance
identified ten generic outcomes (see Table 1) that may be
important from this viewpoint. While these may have some
overlap, they provide important desirable outcomes that are
understandably not highlighted by the end users of any individual
water company – for example, equality between regions and
meeting international standards.
Harmonising the entries in Table 1 from across the four
viewpoints, a list of 17 outcomes can be constructed
(a) increased competition within the UK
(b) internationally competitive
(c) protected environment
(d ) dependable water supply
(e) suitably located supplies
( f ) regional homogeneity
(g) safe, clean drinking water supply
(h) safe, dependable sewerage treatment
(i) sustainable freshwater fisheries
( j) efficient customers
(k) improved communities
(l) affordable, accurate and clear bills
(m) satisfied customers
(n) safe operations
(o) skilled workforce
(p) reputable operators
(q) fair and efficient operators.
It is clear that these do not exist in isolation from one another –
for example, a ‘dependable water supply’ may have an influence
on the achievement of ‘satisfied customers’ as an outcome.
Each individual outcome can be complex and multidimensional,
often evidenced by the nuanced ways in which they are described
by different stakeholders. Step 2 of the five-step process seeks to
identify the ‘dimensions’ of each desired outcome. This is
illustrated here using an outcome common to all four viewpoints:
the provision of a dependable water supply. While ‘dependable’
was used as a collective term for the outcome expressed by the
water companies’ end users, their descriptions of dependability
reveal additional facets that aligned with the governance and
national policy viewpoints shown in Table 1. For example, 30%
of the companies used resilience in their descriptions and 30%
used reliability. Other expansions on the meaning of dependable
in this context include [ Newcastle University] on [21/12/16]. Published with permission by the ICE un■ sufficient to meet the needs of current and future generations
(Northumbrian Water, 2014)
■ supply meets demand (Anglian Water, 2013)
■ available when customers require it (Thames Water, 2013)
■ always there when it is needed (Severn Trent Water, 2015)
■ keeping supplies on (Severn Trent Water, 2015)
■ constant (Southern Water, 2013).
Thus, the dependable water supply outcome includes the notion of
a resilient, reliable, sufficient and secure supply; this is reflected
in the alignment with resilience, reliability and security identified
by the national policy and governance viewpoints. These four
characteristics therefore become the dimensions for the
dependability outcome (see Table 2).
Some of these dimensions may be approaching something close
to a measurable variable; some, in fact, may be directly
measurable. Step 3 of the process seeks to identify the measures
appropriate for each of these dimensions, each measure being a
‘partial indicator’ of the fulfilment of the related outcome. It is
important to note that identification of partial indicators is not
predicated on the pre-existing availability of the necessary data
nor, indeed, if the data are not available, on the identification of
ways to overcome problems associated with obtaining it. With
that in mind, Table 3 suggests potential partial indicators from
those already used by the industry in order to demonstrate the
practicality of identifying suitable measures.
The application of the first three steps of the process in this case
study results in a transparent and explicit link between indicators
already used by the UK’s water industry and the achievement of
indicated high-level desired outcomes. The initial identification of
desired outcomes shows that while the industry has undertaken
valuable work to illuminate these from an end-user perspective
(and in the very specific context of the water sector), the broader
desired outcomes from a policy viewpoint are less clear.
While the desired outcomes related to the sector can be
harmonised to a manageable number across the three viewpoints,
the number of potential dimensions for these, and the ways in
which they may interact with one another, suggest an increasing
level of complexity.
The process outlined by (Dolan et al., 2016) is intended to
embody a set of criteria and principles for performance indicators.
Reflecting on the process as applied here, it can be said that the
indicators are meaningful in that they are unambiguous and relate
to both data already recorded and aspirational outcomes already
identified and, in a related sense, that they are strategic, reflective
of stakeholder needs and future focused. However, as the
currently stated outcomes exist at a sector-specific level, there
may be some constraints on their neutrality in terms of selecting
technology to achieve the outcome. This emerges from the broad
lack of an established long-term vision for the societally desired
outcomes beyond the sector-specific context.147
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The rail case study was also carried out in mid-2015 during a
period of political transition. As an alternative to the approach
used in the water case study, the government’s desired outcomes
were elicited from the incoming government’s election manifesto
and the High-level Output Specification (HLOS) for rail developed
during the tenure of the previous government. The manifesto
provided 21 desired outcomes: these ranged from ‘a strong
economy’ and ‘better communications’, through ‘enjoyment of
culture’ and ‘the big society’, to ‘prevention of terrorism’ and ‘a
dignified retirement’. The principal outcome relating to rail was
‘better roads, trains and modern communications’.
The HLOS (DfT, 2012a) is a statutory requirement as set out by
the 2005 Railway Act (DfT, 2005), which requires the Secretary of
State for Transport to advise the Office of Rail Regulation (now
ORR) what the government wants the railway to achieve during a
5-year control period. Thus, although the HLOS is a government
document, it sets out railway industry outputs. However, the HLOS
must be read in conjunction with the preceding command paper:
Reforming Our Railways: Putting the Customer First (DfT, 2012b).
This describes a vision for the future of the railways in England
and Wales, which includes a range of outcomes: from ‘an engine
for economic growth’, through ‘providing commuters with a safe
route to work’, to ‘connecting communities with public services’.
Network Rail’s licence (ORR, 2014) to operate provides some
insight into the fundamental outcomes expected of it such as a
functioning and maintained cost-effective rail network. NetworkTable 3. Partial indicators for the dependable water supply
outcomeCE undeOutcome
dimensionr the CC-BY Potential outcome-oriented indicatorssu
pp
lyResilient Speed of leak repair
Population supplied by single system
Sites made resilient to rainfall or flood events
Resilience schemes undertaken
Ability to move water around networkReliable Unplanned minutes lost
Water supply interruptions
Asset reliability
Volume of leakage
Number of mains bursts
Customer contacts over water availability
Long-term stability and reliability factorSufficient Water available for use (Environment Agency
definition) per capita – dry year: l/d
Water available for use (Environment Agency
definition) per capita – critical period: l/d
Properties experiencing low pressure
Water resource efficiencySecure Security of supply index – dry year
Security of supply index – critical period
Frequency of water use restrictions
Compliance with security and emergency
measure directive
Delivery of climate change strategyTable 2. Potential outcome dimensions for the water sectorOutcome Outcome dimensions1 Increased competition
within the UKWater supply undertakers
Water sewerage undertakers
Water supply licenses
Undertaker ownership2 Internationally
competitiveGlobal ranking3 Protected environment Environmental sustainability
Environmental impact
Response to climate change
Quality of rivers
Quality of coastal waters
Quality of rivers, lakes and
estuaries
Wildlife protection
Carbon dioxide footprint4 Dependable water supply Reliability of supply
Resilience of supply
Security of supply
Sufficiency of supply5 Suitably located supplies Regional supply deficits
6 Regional homogeneity Performance variation between
regions
7 Safe, clean drinking
water supply
Safety
Cleanliness
Taste quality8 Safe, dependable
sewerage treatmentReliability of waste water removal
Resilience of waste water removal
Security of waste water removal
Sufficiency of waste water removal
Safety of treatment processes
Risk of sewer flooding9 Sustainable freshwater
fisheriesFish population
Fishing activity10 Efficient customers Efficiency of water use
11 Improved communities Engagement
Partnerships
Social impacts
Local economy impacts12 Affordable, accurate and
clear billsAffordability
Accuracy
Clarity
Perceived value for money
Ease of payment
Payment assistance
Informative13 Satisfied customers Customer satisfaction
Contact choice
Ease of contact
Quality of customer service
Responsive14 Safe operations Safety of working practices
Health of employees15 Skilled workforce Qualifications of workforce
Experience of workforce
Capacity of workforce16 Reputable operators Customer satisfaction
Investor confidence17 Fair and efficient
operatorsEfficiency of resource use
Efficiency of expenditure
Returns to investors
Profits
Financial sustainabilitylicense 
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Downloaded byRail’s stated vision is to provide a better railway for a better
Britain: a railway that is safer, more reliable and more efficient
than ever before and that will help to build a thriving, sustainable
economy (Network Rail, 2016b).
The ORR is the regulator for the rail sector. It regulates across ten
broad areas; perhaps those most relevant to the case study are
regulation of Network Rail (the infrastructure operator), competition
and investment. In the case of Network Rail, of particular importance
is monitoring performance, to ensure that Network Rail delivers what
it promised. To do this, ORR monitors a wide range of performance
indicators. For competition, ORR aims to ensure that the rail market
is competitive and fair – for passengers, freight customers, railway
operators and taxpayers; and in terms of investment, ORR controls
the process for those wishing to invest in the rail network.
The rail sector has not explicitly engaged with and integrated the
views of its end users in the same way as the water sector;
however, the ORR’s Consumer Expert Panel meets four times a
year to ‘develop clear and robust evidence of consumer outcomes
in rail’ (ORR, 2016b). The Consumer Expert Panel has not
published their views on consumer outcomes, but Transport Focus
has conducted several studies. For the purpose of obtaining the
passenger view in the case study, two sources were used and
cross-referenced, one looking at a specific aspect of rail and one
looking at rail services in general
■ Future Merseyrail Rolling Stock: What Passengers Want
(Passenger Focus, 2014a) [ Newcastle University] on [21/12/16]. Published with permission by the ICE un■ Rail Passengers’ Priorities for Improvement (Passenger
Focus, 2014b).
The first identified eight outcomes of rail; the second identified
31. These were consolidated where similar to obtain 13 outcomes,
which ranged from personal security and accessibility to reliable
services and convenient ticketing.
Freight end users are represented by bodies such as the Rail
Freight Group, which published a five-point plan for the future
success of rail freight (RFG, 2014)
■ protect capacity
■ continue to invest in strategic freight network
■ stable environment for growth
■ meet the needs of freight customers
■ equity of approach to road and rail freight.
Some of these are inputs (investment) rather than outcomes, while
others are perhaps too vague to be meaningful without further
information (e.g. meeting the needs of customers). Nevertheless,
these can be combined with those of the passenger groups to provide
an end-user perspective. Table 4 provides a list of 19 outcomes
consolidated from those of the main stakeholders described earlier.
The information captured in Table 4 already represents a step
beyond the existing strategic performance indicators for national
infrastructure (reported in the likes of HM Treasury and
Infrastructure UK (2014)). It provides the basis of desiredTable 4. High-level outcome for the rail sector and related stakeholder outcomesNational government End user (passenger and freight)der the CC-BY license Governance (internal and external)1 A strong growing economy
2 A rail network integrated and equitable with other transport
systems
3 Internationally competitive
4 Proactive investment Proactive investment Proactive enhancementSufficient asset management
5 Digitally connected Digitally enabled
6 Convenient ticketing
7 Value for money
8 Protected environment An environmentally sustainable railway Environmental sustainability
9 A safe railway Safety Safe operationsPersonal security
10 A reliable railway Reliable services Reliability
11 Fewer disruptions Resilience
12 Sufficient capacity Protected capacity Sufficient railway
13 Accessible to all Suitably located
14 A financially sustainable
railway
Resource and cost-efficient operations15 Satisfied customers Kept informed Satisfied customers
Frequent services
Comfortable facilities16 Helpful staff
17 Inclusive workforce
18 Regional homogeneity
19 Positive wider social impacts149
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Downloadoutcomes, from three different viewpoints, upon which forward-
focused performance indicators can be based. The subsequent
steps described below build on this information to identify the
specific measures of system-level variability which contribute to
the achievement of these outcomes.
With regard to outcome dimensions. the manifesto sets out
projects to be delivered to achieve a transformed railway. Some of
these appear in the HLOS along with the projects identified
earlier. Network Rail’s outcome dimensions closely align with the
HLOS as would be expected. ORR’s dimensions relate to the
principal areas for which it has regulatory responsibility, and user
dimensions are drawn from the documents referred to earlier.O
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ed by [ Newcastle University] on [21/12/16]. Published with permission by the ITable 5 shows an indicative example range of dimensions relating
to the 19 outcomes in Table 4.
Table 6 provides an example of the sort of partial performance
indicators that underlie the dimensions. The example is for
Network Rail and the outcome/output ‘a safe railway’. The
partial indicators are drawn from Network Rail’s (2015b) Annual
Return 2015.
The application of the process here highlights the tacit way in
which the high-level outcomes facilitated by the rail sector are
articulated. When outcomes are discussed, it is specific to the
direct experiences of rail transport. Table 4 shows the similarities
and differences between the different stakeholders in terms of the
theme and level at which outcomes are articulated. The example
shown in Table 6 demonstrates that it is possible to construct a
transparent chain linking existing indicators to the high-level
outcomes over which they have a causal influence.
Reflecting again on the guideline criteria for evaluating
performance indicators outlined by Dolan et al. (2016), while the
variables in the right-hand column of Table 6 taken in isolation
are not meaningful, or future focused, they take on these
characteristics when presented in the context of their contribution
to the desired outcomes.
Conclusions and recommendations for
practical application
This paper has described the first three steps of a five-step process
for the design of strategic performance indicators that help steerTable 5. Example of stakeholder outcome dimensions for the rail
sectorOutcome Outcome dimension1 A strong growing economy Educated workforce
Good communications2 Integrated/equitable intermodal
transportThrough-ticketing
Good communications
Effective regulation3 Internationally competitive Effective regulation
Technical innovation
Financial innovation4 Proactive investment Effective regulation
Effective markets5 Digitally connected Countrywide networks
Technical compatibility6 Convenient ticketing Through-ticketing
E-commerce platforms
Common standards7 Value for money Effective regulation
Strong markets
Informed customers8 Protected environment Effective regulation
Legislation
Public opinion9 A safe railway Improved passenger safety
Improved worker safety
Improved security on trains
Improved security at stations10 A reliable railway Effective asset management
Well-trained staff11 Resilience System knowledge
Risk analysis12 Sufficient capacity Strategic planning
Accurate forecasting13 Accessibility Legislation
Education14 Financially sustainable Effective cost management
Strong business models15 Satisfied customers Modal choice
Value for money16 Helpful staff Well-trained staff
Staff diversity17 Inclusive workforce Staff diversity
18 Regional homogeneity Region-wide ticketing
19 Positive wider social impacts Better access to employment
SustainabilityTable 6. Partial indicators for the safe railway outcomeCE undeOutcome dimensionr the CC-BY license Potential outcome-oriented
indicatorsra
ilw
ayImproved passenger
safetyPassenger safety indicator (PSI)
Operational close calls (OCCs)Improved worker safety Employee on-duty fatalities
Major injuries
Specific injuries
Lost time injuries (Riddor
reportable 3+ d)
Lost time injuries (Riddor
reportable 7+ d)
Fatalities and weighted injuries
Lost time Injury frequency rate
OCCsImproved security on
trainsPolice response times
Lighting levels
Offending rate
Assaults on staff
Customer perception surveyImproved security at
stationsPolice response times
Lighting levels
Offending rate
Assaults on staff
Customer perception surveyRiddor, Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences
Regulations (DoH, 2013)
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Downloaded byUK infrastructure projects towards meeting society’s high-level
desired outcomes. Step 1 identifies and integrates the outcomes
from the viewpoints of the principal stakeholders involved; step 2
identifies the dimensions characterising the outcomes; and step 3
identifies the so-called partial performance indicators, which
measure dimension performance. Two case studies, one each from
the water and rail sectors, have been used to explore and
demonstrate the viability of the concept.
The research has highlighted two important issues regarding the
identification of desired outcomes. Firstly, they can vary depending
on the stakeholder viewpoint considered – for example, outcomes
desired by end users may be different from those of the system
operators or those with an overview of the wider, long-term
infrastructure system of systems. Secondly, they are rarely stated
explicitly; in many cases the causal relationship between the
actions of the infrastructure system and the delivery of policy
outcomes is tacitly understood at best. Despite these difficulties, the
case studies suggest that with a little effort, the major stakeholder
outcomes can be integrated such that there is a traceable path from
user and industry outcomes, through governance outcomes, to
government’s high-level desired outcomes.
The case studies have demonstrated the complexity potentially
underlying the outcomes; this is often evidenced by the nuanced
ways in which they are described by different stakeholders. Step 2
of the five-step process recognises this complexity with
identification of the desired outcome dimensions. The performance
of each dimension is monitored using partial indicators, partial in
the sense that they monitor a part of the overall outcome. It is
important to note that identification of partial indicators is not
predicated on the pre-existing availability of the necessary data nor,
indeed, if the data are not available, on the identification of ways to
overcome problems associated with obtaining it.
The case studies look only at a sector-by-sector approach; they do
not deal with national infrastructure as a holistic system of
systems; this provides a focus on outcomes that are limited to that
system rather than those which are akin to societal benefits. While
this is sufficient for the purposes of demonstrating the process, it is
not necessarily the most useful pattern of application. Many high-
level societal benefits will require the co-operation of multiple
infrastructure systems, and as such, a suite of outcome-oriented
measures indicative of those benefits would need to consider
multiple sectors. This is clear from the occurrence, even within a
sector-by-sector approach, of such outcomes as a protected
environment, a strong economy and improved communities.
Furthermore, even those outcomes which appear on the surface to
be within the boundaries of a single sector (e.g. safe, dependable
sewage treatment) rely significantly on interdependencies with
other infrastructure sectors. This is the focus of step 4 of the
process, which is outside the scope of this paper.
The fact that outcomes are not mutually exclusive is an important
issue that extends to consideration of the extent to which a given [ Newcastle University] on [21/12/16]. Published with permission by the ICE undimension influences multiple outcomes. The research shows the
complex, closely coupled nature of the railway and flags up the
need to understand the degree to which outcomes are related and
the relative influence of dimensions. To produce a set of
outcomes, outcome dimensions and partial indicators that help
guide infrastructure development, more information is needed
about the nature and strength of these relationships. It is
recommended that this be the subject of further research.
Despite the term ‘outcome’ being formally used within the
context of infrastructure policy as ‘high-level societal benefits’, it
is often interpreted differently within industry. Indeed ‘outcome’
is on occasion used to describe the functional ‘outputs’ of the
system. It would be helpful to the application of this process if
agreement could be reached between the main stakeholders as to a
shared terminology designed to reduce the risk of confusion.
It is interesting to note that while the top-to-bottom (i.e. from the
government to industry by way of regulator) dissemination of
outcomes, dimensions and indicators is very strong for rail, the
involvement of the customer (both passenger and freight) in this is
limited. Certainly the views of customers are sought, but it is not
clear at what point, if at all, these are incorporated into the
top–down process. It is recommended that fundamental to achieving
any success in creating meaningful performance indicators, channels
should be amended to facilitate a more bottom–up and holistic
consideration and communication of desired outcomes.
The process applied here should be of interest to bodies such as
the UK’s newly formed Infrastructure and Projects Authority,
tasked as it is with developing an understanding of the country’s
infrastructure needs and the means by which the fulfilment of
those needs will be monitored. It also sits alongside efforts in
New Zealand (Beca and Covec, 2013) and Australia (Sharp et al.,
2014) to develop a more explicit link between infrastructure
performance and societally valued outcomes. Crucially, however,
these case studies underline the need for the desired outcomes that
society expects infrastructure to facilitate to be defined. Only then
can the purpose of the infrastructure systems be understood and
their strategic performance meaningfully evaluated. It follows that
policies relating to infrastructure systems must clearly define the
outcomes that the systems of relevance are expected to facilitate.
Without this it is not possible to construct meaningful
performance indicators.
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